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JURISDICTION 
Section 63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act Confers Jurisdiction Upon the Court of Appeals in This 
Matter. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Mr. Johnson was awarded unemployment compensation 
benefits by Administrative Law Judge Barnes of rh? Department of 
Employment Security. Morton Thiokol appealed this decision to 
the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah. The 
Board overturned Judge Barnes1 decision ,7e are appealing the 
Board of Review's decision. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Whether or not the presence of any quantity of 
marijuana in Claimant's system is sufficient to determine that 
such presence is in violation of section 35-4-5(b)(1) U.C.A. 
notwithstanding the fact that the evidence indicated that no 
drugs were consumed on employer's premises, or on employer's time 
and where claimant was not impaired while at work. 
II. Whether or not termination upon the presence of 
any marijuana in Claimant's system is per se unreasonable. 
III. Whether or not the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing 
Act violates equal protection for the reason that federal, state 
and other political subdivision employees are exempt from the 
effect of this act. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
An initial hearing was held on an unemployment 
insurance matter on February 11, 1988. Mr. Johnson at that 
particular point had been allowed unemployment insurance benefits 
by the Department on a claim filed effective December 20, 1987. 
The Department held the Mr. Johnson was not discharged from his 
employment with Morton Thiokol for just cause within the meaning 
of the Utah Employment Security Act. Mr. Johnson was represented 
at the hearing by David Bert Havas, Attorney at Law. The 
employer was also represented at that hearing by James Fox. The 
Administrative Law Judge then issued a decision dated February 
17, 1988 which allowed unemployment insurance benefits to Mr. 
Johnson. The Administrative Law Judge's decision dated February 
17, 1988 affirmed the prior Department decision which had allowed 
unemployment insurance benefits to Mr. Johnson finding that Mr. 
Johnson was discharged from his employment but for 
nondisqualifying conduct within the meaning of the Utah 
Employment Security Act. Also the employer was charged with 
benefit costs associated with the claim. 
The employer thereafter filed an appeal to the Board of 
Review, that appeal being filed through their unemployment 
insurance consultant representative, R.E. Harrington. A letter 
was mailed to the Board of Review dated February 25, 1988. 
pursuant to that, correspondence as sent to the employer and also 
Mr. Johnson regarding the fact that the letter had been mailed 
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and that the initial Administrative Law Judge's decision had been 
challenged. However, a copy of that letter was not mailed to Mr. 
Johnson's representative in this matter, David Bert Havas, and 
the information in the record shows that the correspondence 
mailed to Mr. Johnson was returned as it was mailed to an 
incorrect address. The Board of Review then issued a decision 
dated May 12, 1988 which reversed the Administrative Law Judge's 
decision denying unemployment insurance benefits to Mr. Johnson 
effective December 20, 1987. 
Again, Mr. Johnson's attorney was not mailed a copy of 
the Board of Review's decision and the decision that was mailed 
to Mr. Johnson came back to the Department as it was sent to an 
incorrect address. 
On May 23, 1988, Attorney Havas sent a letter to the 
Board of Review requesting reconsideration, indicating in his 
letter that he did not feel that he had been given proper 
notification of the employer's appeal to the Board of Review nor 
had he had an opportunity to respond to their appeal. In a 
letter dated May 25, 1988 the Board granted Attorney Havas' 
request for reconsideration. On June 8, 1988 Attorney Havas 
submitted a brief to the Board of Review wherein he requested 
reconsideration, providing information then regarding why he felt 
the Administrative Law Judge's decision dated February 17, 1988 
should have been affirmed. 
On October 14, 1983 the Administrative Law Judge 
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received a notice from the Board of Review remanding the case, 
asking the Administrative Law Judge to reopen the hearing and to 
call as an expert witness in this matter Ellwood Loveridge. 
At that hearing, Mr. Fox testified that Mr. Johnson was 
involved in an accident with a company vehicle in Roy, Utah on 
September 21, 1987, and under the alcohol and drug policy of 
Thiokol, any employee that is involved in an accident or incident 
must be tested. Transcript of Hearing Held February 11, 1988 
(hereafter "Transcript I"), Page 5. 
Mr. Johnson was tested at that time and the test 
results were positive for marijuana. Transcript I, Page 5. Mr. 
Johnson had a reading of 128 nanograms. Second Hearing, 
Transcript of Hearing Held October 26, 1988 (hereafter 
"Transcript II"), Page 28. Twenty nanograms or above is 
considered a positive test result for Thiokol. Transcript II, 
Page 24. 
Thiokol reviewed the situation and discovered that Mr. 
Johnson was not at fault for this accident and gave him a three 
day disciplinary suspension. Transcript I, Page 5. Mr. Johnson 
was told at that time that he would be subject to follow-up 
testing as is part of Thiokol's drug and alcohol program. 
Transcript I, Page 5. On November 25, 1987, Mr. Johnson was 
tested again as part of Thiokol's follow-up program and that 
result was 25 nanograms which was a positive test. Transcript I, 
Page 5 and Transcript II, Page 24. This resulted in his 
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termination on December 11, 1987. Transcript I, Page 5. 
Mr. Fox testified that Mr. Johnson was an average 
employee with no reprimands or adverse information in his 
employee file (Transcript I, Page 9) and that the sole reason Mr. 
Johnson was tested was because of an accident in a company 
vehicle that was determined not to be Mr. Johnson's fault. 
Transcript I, Page 8. Mr. Fox further testified that there was 
no claim by the company that Mr. Johnson acted against the 
interests of the employer, (Transcript I, Page 8) and there was 
no evidence that Mr. Johnson consumed any marijuana on company 
time or company premises. Transcript I, Page 10. Mr. Johnson 
did state that he did no consume marijuana on company time or 
company premises and never went to work under the influence of 
marijuana. Transcript I, Page 11. 
Mr. Johnson testified that he had not used marijuana 
after his first drug test and that he believed the second test 
was positive because of passive inhalation. Transcript I, Page 
12. Mr. Johnson further stated that he was exposed to marijuana 
smoke at least three or four times a day because his roommates 
smoked marijuana in the house. Transcript I, Page 12. Dr. Kerr 
testified that Thiokol complies with the requirements of the Utah 
Drug and Alcohol Testing Statute (Transcript II, Page 23) and 
they exceed the statutory requirements for chain of custody, 
(Transcript II, Page 23) and that a second test was performed to 
confirm the positive reading on the first test. Transcript II, 
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Page 23. Dr. Kerr first testified that marijuana could stay in 
an individual's system for up to 81 daysf (Transcript II, Page 
25) but Dr. Kerr later testified that marijuana would stay in an 
individuals system for only four to six weeks or forty-two days. 
Transcript II, Page 27. Dr. Loveridge testified that he had 
tested individuals for marijuana who had similar quantities of 
marijuana in their systems as Mr. Johnson and that these 
individuals still tested positive after three months of 
abstinence from using marijuana. Transcript II, Page 28. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Mr. Johnson should be awarded workman's compensation 
benefits because Mr. Johnson did not consume marijuana on 
employer's premises, or employer's time, and Mr. Johnson was not 
impaired while at work. The use of drugs while off the job is 
not a sufficient basis to deny unemployment compensation benefits 
unless the employer can show that the Mr. Johnson's off the job 
use of drugs adversely affects his ability to do his job or 
adversely affect the employer's legitimate business interests. 
Furthermore, Mr. Johnson was discharged from work and 
consequently denied workman's compensation benefits because he 
tested positive for marijuana a second time. The amount of 
marijuana in Mr. Johnson's system was substantially less at his 
second test approximately two months later than at his first 
test, Mr. Johnson believes he tested positive because of passive 
inhalation or because he was tested a second time before his 
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system could be cleared of marijuana from his prior use. 
Finally, the Utah Drug and Alcohol testing act violates 
equal protection because it does not apply to federal, state or 
other political subdivision employers and therefore, a large 
segment of Utah's work force is exempt from the effect of this 
legislation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENCE OF ANY 
QUANTITY OF MARIJUANA IN CLAIMANT'S 
SYSTEM IS SUFFICIENT TO DETERMINE 
THAT SUCH PRESENCE IS IN VIOLATION 
OF SECTION 35-4-5(b)(l) U.C.A. 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE 
EVIDENCE INDICATED THAT NO DRUGS 
WERE CONSUMED ON EMPLOYER'S 
PREMISES, OR ON EMPLOYER'S TIME AND 
WHERE CLAIMANT WAS NOT IMPAIRED 
WHILE AT WORK. 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the allowance of 
benefits in the case of Champlin Petroleum Company v. Department 
of Employment Security, 744 P.2d 330 Utah 1987, even though it 
was a fact that the claimant used marijuana while an employee of 
Champlin. The Court did not consider the use of drugs while off 
the job sufficient basis to deny benefits because the drug use 
did not adversely affect the claimant's ability to perform his 
work even thought the drug use did contribute to the Claimant's 
mental illness which eventually resulted in absence due to 
hospitalization. The Court stated: 
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Because the critical questions here is 
whether Robinson was fired for "just cause," 
we must focus on what that "cause" was. 
There is no evidence that Robinson's work 
performance up to his April 30f 1986 
hospitalization was anything but acceptable 
to Champlin, even though Robinson admitted at 
the hearing that he smoked marijuana twice a 
week until March, 1986, after finishing his 
work shift, in order to help him sleep. 
Indeed, Champlin's District Manager, 
Robinson's boss, testified unequivocally that 
Robinson v/as a satisfactory employee who had 
no difficulty in maintaining and performing 
his job. There is also no evidence in the 
record that Robinson violated company policy 
by reporting to work under the influence of 
marijuana or by using it while on the job. 
Champlin Petroleum Co., at page 332. 
Clearly the Champlin Court did not consider off the job 
use of an illegal drug sufficient grounds for a denial of 
benefits absent evidence that the drug use adversely affected the 
worker's ability to do his work. The Board's position in the 
case at hand is that benefits may be denied for any positive drug 
results even though the drug use does not clearly affect the 
employer's legitimate business interests. Such a provisions in 
the law is inconsistent with the current position of the court 
and with the basic principles of the unemployment insurance 
program which is to pay benefits to people who are discharged for 
reasons not "connected with work". 
In the present case the employer clearly does not claim 
that the presence of marijuana in Mr. Johnson's system is 
indicative that his conduct is an act or omission in connection 
with his employment which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and 
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adverse to the employerfs interest. 
The employer's sole claim is that Mr. Johnson having 
had marijuana in his system is sufficient cause to terminate him. 
Cause for termination in and of itself is not enough to deny 
benefits to a claimant. The conduct of claimant needs to be 
viewed to determine whether it is of the type to allow a denial 
of eligibility for benefits. 
Our Court of Appeals has recently reiterated the 
standard to be followed. The Court thus said that "a claimant is 
terminated for just cause, and is thereby precluded from 
receiving unemployment benefits, when his or her culpability, 
control over the conduct and knowledge that the conduct will 
likely result in termination is shown. Champlin at 331. 
Although Mr. Johnson concedes that he knew that the 
presence of marijuana in his system would likely result in 
termination, there is no showing that he was culpable in having 
any marijuana in his system at the time of the test on November 
25, 1987, or had any control thereover. In fact Mr. Johnson's 
belief of passive inhalation of marijuana presence in his system 
is not disputed. A more likely reason for such presence in as 
small a quantity as was testified to at the hearing is that 
marijuana takes so long to leave a person's system as Professor 
Dubowski indicated in the National Law Journal article Volume 8, 
No. 29, Monday, April 7, 1986, Drug Testing: The Scene is Set for 
A Dramatic Legal Collision. In either event there is no showing 
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of culpability or control and thus there can be no denial of 
eligibility. 
The department of Employment Security's administrative 
rule which interprets "just cause" as used in Section 35-4-
5(b)(1) U.C.A. was set out in Champlin at 332. The rule gives 
the following as guidance to the meaning of culpability: 
a. Culpability 
"This is the seriousness of the 
conduct or the severity of the 
offense as it affects continuance 
of the employment relationship. 
The discharge must have been 
necessary to avoid actual or 
potential harm to the employer's 
rightful interests. A discharge 
would not be considered "necessary" 
if it is not consistent with 
reasonable employment practices. 
The wrongness of the conduct must 
be considered in the context of the 
particular employment and how it 
affects the employer's rights. If 
the conduct was an isolated 
incident of poor judgment and there 
is no expectation that the conduct 
will be continued or repeated, 
potential harm may not be shown and 
therefore it is not necessary to 
discharge the employee. 
c. Control 
The conduct must have been within 
the power and the capacity of the 
claimant to control or prevent. 
Unemployment Insurance Rule 35-4-5(b)(1) para. Bl (1986). 
Champlin at 332. 
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The Court in Clearfield City v. Department of 
Employment Security, 663 P.2d 440, at 441 (Utah, 1983) 
articulated a three prong test to be used in determining whether 
there was "just cause" to terminate a claimant's unemployment 
benefits. This three prong test also requires the finding of 
some fault or culpability on the part of claimant for him to be 
ineligible for unemployment compensation. The first prong is, 
(1) was the conduct in connection with employment; (2) was the 
conduct adverse to the employer's interests; and (3) whether the 
conduct evidenced a sufficient degree of culpability or was the 
conduct deliberate, wilful or wanton. Lane v. Board of Review of 
Ind. Comm., 727 P.2d 206 at 210, (Utah 1986) 
There is no evidence in the record that Mr. Johnson 
reported to work under the influence of marijuana or used 
marijuana on the job. Mr. Johnson's use of marijuana was only 
done after work. Therefore, his acts were not connected to his 
employment. The employer also stated that Mr. Johnson was a 
satisfactory worker. Therefore, his acts were not adverse to his 
employer's interests. Finally, Mr. Johnson's acts were not 
willful. In Logan Regional Hospital v. Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, 723 P.2d 427 (Utah 
1986) the Claimant was discharged from his job and the Board of 
Review determined that the Claimant was not discharged for "good 
cause" and awarded unemployment benefits because the judge found 
that the circumstances leading to Claimant's- discharge were the 
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result of inadvertent conditions beyond his power and control, 
which precluded discharge for just cause. 
In the case at hand Mr. Johnson is in a similar 
situation in that he states that he abstained from using 
marijuana after his first drug test and that he was victim of 
passive inhalation. For the reason that his roommates smoked 
marijuana nightly in the apartment in which he lived while they 
watched television. Therefore, there is no culpability or fault 
on the part of Mr. Johnson and where the element of fault is 
lacking, the employee's conduct may be sufficient for discharge, 
but it is not necessarily sufficient for a disqualification from 
benefits under the Unemployment Security Act Logan at 429. Mr. 
Johnson's good faith error in judgment of sitting in the same 
room with persons using marijuana does not constitute culpable 
conduct which precludes a discharged employee from receiving 
unemployment compensation benefits. Logan at 429. 
Therefore, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge 
should be affirmed as to the eligibility of Mr. Johnson for 
unemployment compensation. As is stated in Champlin "not every 
cause for discharge provides a basis to deny eligibility for 
unemployment compensation," citing Clearfield City v. Dep't of 
Empl. Sec, 663 P.2d 440, 441 (Utah, 1983), and Board of 
Education of Sevier County v. Board of Review, 701 P.2d 1064. 
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II. 
WHETHER OR NOT TERMINATION UPON THE 
PRESENCE OF ANY MARIJUANA IN 
CLAIMANT'S SYSTEM IS PER SE 
UNREASONABLE. 
The transcript of the hearing clearly shows that the 
sole reason for the discharge of claimant was because of his 
status of having an amount of marijuana in his system. 
Transcript I, pages 5, 8, 9 and 10. 
As to the amount of marijuana in his system, the 
Claimant indicates that there were 25 nanogram in his system in 
November, 1987, which is substantially less than the 123 nanogram 
which were in his system in September, 1987, following the 
accident. Transcript I, pages 7 and 10. Transcript I, page 12. 
Claimant has denied any marijuana use between the September, 
1987, testing and the November, 1987, testing. His belief is 
that the presence of marijuana is as a result of passive 
inhalation of marijuana smoke, which theory was supported by Dr. 
Loveridge. Transcript II, page 30. 
However, the employer did not care about the correctness of this 
theory since its rule only requires the presence of marijuana in 
order for an employee to be subject to dismissal. This standard 
is unreasonable, for the reason that there is no rational basis 
shown between the rule and the effect that any presence of 
marijuana may have on the employer's interest. It is well 
recognized that drug tests cannot show the amount of drug use or 
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time of drug use and do not establish impairment. In fact the 
employer does not claim any conduct adverse to its interest other 
than the presence of marijuana in claimant's system. 
The employer recognizes the fact that marijuana can be 
detected long after consumption. The employer indicates that 
marijuana can remain in the system from 21 to 45 days. 
Transcript I, page 8. In actuality, marijuana can be detected in 
the system for a much longer period of time. Marijuana can be 
detected several months after it was used and may be detected as 
long as 81 days after it was used according to Professor Kurt 
Dubowskif Professor of Forensic Toxicology at the University of 
Oklahoma. See The National Law Journal, Volume 8, No. 29, 
Monday, April 7, 1986, Drug Testing: The scene is set for a 
dramatic legal collision, page 24. 
Dr. Loveridge states that in his test for the Salt Lake 
City and County Health Department, they have had people who have 
tested positive in the 120's as Mr. Johnson did, and still tested 
positive after abstaining from using marijuana for three months. 
Transcript II, page 28 
In light of these facts, a test result some 65 days 
later which went from 125 nanogram in September down to 25 
nanogram in November would certainly indicate a likelihood that 
the second test would merely show the remnants of any marijuana 
present at the time of the first test. 
The employer's rule that 20 nanogram is a positive test 
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for marijuana and grounds for dismissal is per se unreasonable 
because, the Utah Drug and Alcohol Act does not establish minimum 
standards for the conclusion that a drug test is positive. 
In the case of marijuana, there are conflicting 
opinions as to what constitutes a positive test. The military 
services consider 100 nanogram as the minimum amount for a 
positive test determination while some county testing facilities 
consider 50 monograms a positive test result and some local 
testing labs, including the lab that tested Mr. Johnson, report a 
positive result for 20 nanogram. 
It is possible that 20 or more nanogram could be found 
in a person who does not use marijuana, but is in the presence of 
people who do through passive inhalation. Such is the case with 
Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson testified that his roommates used 
marijuana in his presence nightly while watching television and 
that this is the reason Claimant tested 25 nanogram at his second 
test in November, 1987. 
Finally, the validity of any drug test depends heavily 
on the knowledge and skill of the technician who interprets it. 
There are no federal or industrial standards for professional 
competence and almost no state legislation to regulate this 
critical area. Drug tests cannot show the amount of drug use or 
time of drug use and do not establish impairment. Studies have 
shown that marijuana can be detected up to and beyond 81 days 
after discontinuing use. For the foregoing reasons, termination 
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upon the presence of any marijuana in Mr. Johnson's system is 
unreasonable. 
III. 
WHETHER OR NOT THE UTAH DRUG AND 
ALCOHOL TESTING ACT VIOLATES EQUAL 
PROTECTION FOR THE REASON THAT 
FEDERAL, STATE AND OTHER POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISION EMPLOYEES ARE EXEMPT 
FROM THE EFFECT OF THIS ACT. 
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution states: 
"All laws of a general nature shall 
have uniform operation". The 
fourteenth amendment of the United 
States Constitution prohibits the 
states from enacting laws that deny 
"any person within its jurisdiction 
equal protection of the laws". 
Although their language is 
dissimilar, these provisions embody 
the same general principle: persons 
similarly situated should be 
treated similarly. Malan v. 
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 at 669. (Utah 
1984) 
The Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act does, Section 34-
38-2(3) excludes employers who are classified federal, state 
government or other political subdivisions. A considerable 
number of individuals in Utah's work force are employed by 
federal, state or other political subdivision. For this reason, 
the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act violates equal protection, 
it denies non-governmental employees the same protection from the 
Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act as the similarly situated 
governmental employees enjoy. 
The Malan Court stated that to determine whether a 
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statute meets equal protection standards depends upon the 
objective of the statute and whether the classifications 
established provide a reasonable basis for promoting those 
objectives. Malan at 670 
Section 34-38-1 of the Utah Code Annotated entitled 
Purpose and Intent of Chapter states that the purpose of this 
chapter is to keep the work place free of drugs and alcohol in 
order to produce a healthy and productive work force and to 
insure safe working conditions. The fact that governmental 
employees are excluded under this act has no reasonable basis 
for promoting this objective. 
Finally, when persons are similarly situated, it is 
unconstitutional to single out one person or group of persons 
from among a large class on the basis of a tenuous justification 
that has little or not merit Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 at 671 
(Utah, 1984) Dodge Town, Inc. v. Romney, 480 P.2d 461 (Utah, 
1971) 
The Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act is arbitrary 
because it treats differently those employees who are similarly 
situated. Specifically, there is no legitimate justification for 
treating governmental employees differently than non-governmental 
employees. For the foregoing reasons, this act violates equal 
protection and is therefore unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
Claimant/Appellant respectfully requests that the 
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decision of the Board of Review be reversed and that he be 
allowed unemployment compensation benefits for the reason that he 
was not in violation of Section 35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act. 
Unless an employer can show that an employee is 
impaired by the consumption of drugs, has consumed drugs on 
employer's premises or on the employers time or that employer was 
acting against the employerfs rightful interest in a deliberate, 
willful or wanton mannerf Claimant cannot be denied eligibility 
for unemployment benefits. 
DATED this jf day of March, 1989. 
< 
JOSlTCUMMINGS Of 
DAVID BERT HAVAS AND ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Claimant 
s 
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ADDENDUM 
34-38-1 Legislative Findings - Purpose and Intent of Chapter 
The Legislature finds that a healthy and productive 
work force, safe working conditions free from the 
effects of drugs and alcohol, and maintenance of the 
quality of products produced and services rendered in 
this state, are important to employers, employees, and 
the general public. The Legislature further finds that 
the abuse of drugs and alcohol creates a variety of 
workplace problems, including increased injuries on the 
job, increased absenteeism, increased financial burden 
on health and benefit programs, increased workplace 
theft, decreased employee morale, decreased 
productivity, and a decline in the quality of products 
and services. 
Therefore, in balancing the interests of employers, 
employees, and the welfare of the general public, the 
Legislature finds that fair and equitable testing for 
drugs and alcohol in the workplace, in accordance with 
this chapter, is in the best interest of all parties. 
The Legislature does not intend to prohibit any 
employee from seeking damages or job reinstatement, if 
action was taken by his employer based on a false drug 
or alcohol test result. 
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34-38-2(3) Definitions. 
(3) "Employer" means any person, firmf or corporation, 
including any public utility or transit district, which 
has one or more workers or operators employed in the 
same business, or in or about the same establishment, 
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or 
written. "Employer" does not include the federal or 
state government, or other local political 
subdivisions. 
35-4-5 Ineligibility for Benefits. 
An individual is ineligible for benefits or for 
purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
(b)(1) For the week in which the Claimant was 
discharged for just cause or for an act or omission in 
connection with employment, not constitution a crime, 
which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to 
the employer's rightful interest, if so found by the 
commission, and thereafter until the Claimant has 
earned an amount equal to at least six times the 
Claimant's weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered 
employment. 
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CONSTITOTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship - Due Process of Law - Equal 
Protection] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due . 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Article I, Section 24 
Sec. 24 [Uniform Operation of Laws] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation. 
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